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Demand for many products like fashion garments, shoes, sportswear, air-conditioners, heaters, certain types of food like ice cream and cold drinks, and consumption of goods and services rel ated to the tourism industry is highly seasonal, fluctuating, and often hard to predict. It is also extremely difficult to use techniques of demand management to completely smoothen out fluctuations and reduce uncertainty. The traditional framework of production planning and material resources planning (MRP) is unsuitable for these products. The just-in-time (JIT) framework can provide quick response times for stable demand, but will not work with highly seasonal and fluctuating demand. Hence, there is a need for an alternative way of managing such operations.
Production must often respond very quickly to changing and unpredictable demand. Slow response leads to lost sales for demand that cannot be met and to unsold inventory of products produced in excess of demand. In fact, inventory holding costs and stockout costs are usually a high proportion of total costs. Many of these industries are characterized by fierce competition, relatively low entry barriers, and increasingly sophisticated consumer demand. Very often, no single business unit enjoys a large market share, and there are a number of units in operation. This places an additional burden on manufacturing to maintain quality standards and keep costs down. Manufacturing has to also deal with large product varieties. The product range itself is constantly changing, and in many cases like the fashion garments and footwear industry, products are being constantly redesigned.
In this context, management research has focused on the large firm, which is often the final customer for a number of smaller firms from which it outsources raw materials, intermediates, parts, components, and services. Signorelli and Heskett (1984) and Hammond and Raman (1994) describe operations strategies for large firms like Benetton and Sport Obermeyer, which outsource a significant proportion of their activities. Fisher (1997) provides a conceptual framework for designing supply chains for such firms. These strategies help the large firm to manage long lead times, Vol. 24, No. 4, October-December 1999 uncertainties, volume fluctuations, and product variety without adding significantly to costs. Smitka (1991) and Basant et al. (1998) have studied small supplier firms in the automobile sector. However, the context is different because the automobile industry does not face the same kind of uncertainty, seasonality, and product variety. Another stream of research on small firms has come from the industrial economics stream, and has focused on industrial districts and networks (see, for instance, Cadene and Holmstrom, 1998) . It addresses government policy and regulation issues and industry level responses that enable firms to compete. However, there is a need to conceptualize firm level strategies for smaller firms.
Consider the i nternational leather shoe industry. The economics of shoe production has forced a shift in manufacturing from the developed countries to the developing countries mainly due to rising labour and management costs. Production has shifted to Brazil, Taiwan, China, and India to name a few countries. However, the markets and purchasing power remain in the West. Thus, the industry is characterized by a large amount of international trade. The Western shoe markets have two buying seasons: the spring and summer season, and the winter season. Designs are picked up by the major shoe companies in biannual trade fairs held in Europe. The trade fairs held in September would decide the designs for the spring and summer season of the following year. A commercial assessment is made and the final designs for the next season are selected by the shoe companies.
Most of the exporters in India act as jobbers for major established shoe companies in the West, especially Western Europe. Thus, the exporters do not have their own brand names for the shoes they make, nor do they have any influence over the distribution channels or over the ultimate market. They compete for orders and receive low prices. The price received by the exporter and the ultimate retail price has wide gaps, typically over 300 per cent. Thus, an exporter would often receive about $15 to $20 for a shoe selling for $60 or more in the retail market. Exporters send samples based on designs sent by the customer, and, if one out of four samples submitted results in a final order, then it is considered a good operation.
There are, broadly speaking, two different strategies that can be used for exports. One is the production of mass volume, standard design shoes. The other is the production of high quality, higher priced shoes with a variety of designs with lower volumes. Both these strategies have different implications for management. In India, nearly all exports 8 are of the latter type.
Consider another example, the textile dye industry, where Ciba is a major globa l player. Textile dyes is a fashion driven industry which makes demand difficult to predict. Summer shades are lighter or pastel coloured and differ from winter shades which are darker. Fashion often determines which colours would dominate a particular season. Sometimes, lighter shades become fashionable in winter leading to a big fall in the season's sales of textile dyes. In addition, there is considerable seasonality in total sales over the year since summer pastel shades on the average need about one tenth the dye quantities as compared to winter shades. The industry is mature and innovation and new technology introduction is relatively low. Environmental regulations make it either impossible or uneconomical to produce many of these dyes and chemicals in Switzerland and has led to the location of dye manufacturing in developing countries, whereas large markets are located in Europe, Japan, and the US. This makes the textile dye business far more complex and challenging to manage.
Ciba started looking for cheaper sources of textile dyes, and chose India as a major source. There were three broad product categories: dispersed dyes, used in polyester fabric, reactive dyes for cotton, and acid and metal complex dyes for silk, wool, and nylon. Each product category had about 15 shades. Products also varied by end use: some products were used as dyes and some were used for printing fabrics. Dyeing process also varies and could be either continuous for high affinity dyes, or batch dyeing for other dyes, or hot and cold dyeing. Most of the procurement was in the form of dispersed dyes, largely obtained from IDI, its Indian joint venture partner. In addition, Ciba bought products from about 110 manufacturers of dyes and chemicals in India. About 3000 tonne of products were exported and generated Rs 800 million in revenues.
Manufacturing practices and quality consciousness in India were different from overseas market requirements. Ciba, therefore, invested heavily in supplier development. Manufacturing was largely in batches since it was a continuous process, which in turn led to longer lead times and inventories. Ciba introduced new systems in the production of dyes in India, expanded their supplier base, and the range of applications of dyes. Ciba India sold almost entirely to Ciba plants overseas who bought dyes at an intermediate stage. As mentioned earlier, they sourced products from about 110 suppliers. The large supplier base helped them to handle variations in volume and Vikalpa the large product variety since certain products could be earmarked for certain suppliers. This considerably simplified the task of coordinating supplies. However, Ciba operations in India went beyond conventional trading. They helped introduce Ciba technology or manufacturing processes to domestic producers, ensured quality, and carried out various tests on products before shipping them. Quality problems related to the shade or colour, the solubility of the dye, and strength or concentration of pigment.
Although both examples relate to firms in the export market, similar issues arise in domestic markets, where demand fluctuations, new product introductions, and other uncertainties could place a tremendous strain on smaller supplier firms. They need to evolve responses that help them in this situation. Often, they search for solutions among well-known, tried, and tested operational approaches like JIT, TQM, BPR and so on. However, these techniques, though necessary and useful, are unlikely to provide complete solutions, because they do not address various types of uncertainties and volume fluctuations.
Strategic Role of Supply Chain Management
Two important characteristics have crucial implications for management of firms in such industries. The first one is the capital structure. These businesses often have low capital investments and very high working capital requirements. The second one is that there are a number of links in the supply chain often located in different countries. For instance, in the leather footwear industry, leather for soles moves from Argentina to developing countries like Brazil, India, and the Far East, is converted to shoes, and then shipped to markets in the US and Western Europe. Effective supply chain management is often the key to competitive advantage.
These industries are, therefore, characterized by seasonal and fluctuating demand, uncertainty, a large product range which changes from season to season and often during a season itself, high working capital requirements, large movements of intermediate and final products between different links in the supply chain, and high degree of competition. The challenge for businesses is to provide quality products at low cost and respond quickly to changing and unpredictable demand.
Unlike markets where demand is more stable and predictable, firms in such industries face higher costs. One key decision facing firms is how much capacity to build. If they build capacity to meet peak demand, Vol. 24, No. 4, October-December 1999 then they minimize costs of lost sales and inventory, but incur very high fixed costs. These fixed costs could be in terms of investments in plant and machinery or in terms of a larger work force. Additional shifts, overtime, and laying off workers during demand downturns are options which could help reduce costs, but there are limits to these options especially if they have to be used on a sustained basis. If they build capacity closer to average demand, fixed costs come down. However, lower capacity forces the firm to produce to stock well in advance of the peak season, adding to inventory costs. If demand is highly uncertain, then producing to stock is risky since the type of products that will sell much later cannot be predicted accurately. If the firm is producing a wide variety of products, the chances are high that some products are overstocked and other products understocked. This leads to high costs of unsold stocks and lost sales.
Firms often use outsourcing to minimize risks and costs. Usually this outsourcing takes the form of buying fin ished or almost finished goods from a large number of small suppliers. This pattern is observed in the garments and shoe industries. Buyers can match their buying with market trends as demand goes up and down or moves across different products since they often have a large supplier base from which to buy. Often the costs of supplier firms are lower since they can employ cheaper labour and management.
In such industries, it is useful to distinguish between supplier firms that sell intermediate or even final products to other firms, and buyer firms that buy output from supplier firms and sell to the final consumer. Thus, a large fashion garment firm might sell products under its various brand names to the final consumer through the distribution channels. This firm in turn buys intermediate or finished garments from supplier firms. These supplier firms often do not have direct access to the consumer market either because they have not established a brand or because they are geographically far removed from lucrative markets (as in the case of garment makers in developing countries supplying garments to branded firms selling in developed countries) or because they do not have access to critical technology. They are, therefore, forced to sell their output to firms with an established presence in consumer markets. Selling in local markets is often not attractive for supplier firms for several reasons. First, it requires marketing skills and funds, which smaller firms often do not have. Second, and more important, since they do not own the brands for the products they make, they cannot command the same price from the market. Third, even if they try to sell under another brand name in the local market, they face the risk of losing out on steady orders from buyer firms which often insist on exclusive selling arrangements to protect their designs and brands.
Buyer firms are usually in a better position than supplier firms. They can source raw materials and finished products from a large number of supplier firms to minimize uncertainty in demand, negotiate better prices from the smaller supplier firms, and concentrate largely on purchase, marketing, and distribution. If they produce everything themselves, they would face the problem of matching demand production and capacity, and end up with higher costs. In some cases, they keep a critical step in the production process to themselves and source only intermediate products from suppliers. For instance, Benetton postpones dyeing of garments to the last step in garment manufacture, and does it largely in-house. Similarly, Ciba sources intermediate textile dyes from supplier firms in developing countries and does the final finishing activity in-house in Switzerland. In both these cases, critical technologies, whether it is dyeing finished garments or finishing intermediate textile dyes, are not passed onto supplier firms. Buyer firms also operate with larger margins because they have established brand names, have easier access to markets, and often have proprietary technology. These higher margins also help them to face uncertainties in the market.
An individual supplier firm, on the other hand, is more exposed to risks since it faces several uncertainties with respect to total number of orders it receives and the type of products that need to be made. Often these firms are small and have low margins. They are also in a weak bargaining position with respect to buyer firms.
Responses of buyer and supplier firms are different. Although both are interested in minimizing cost while meeting market and quality needs, buyer firms are more interested in minimizing the cost of lost sales and stockouts, whereas supplier firms are more interested in minimizing the cost of unsold stocks. This could be due to several reasons. First, buyer firms are closer to the ultimate consumer and are more aware of the risk of consumers switching to competitors. Second, as mentioned earlier, buyer firms enjoy higher margins and lost sales are more expensive than unsold stocks or stocks sold at discounts. Supplier firms, on the other hand, are often small in size and are squeezed for profits because of the low prices they can command from buyers. They respond by producing to order rather than producing to stock, and if working capital requirement is high, they often order expensive raw materials after receiving orders. This minimizes inventory holding costs and the risk of unsold stocks, but leads to longer lead times and increases the risk of lost sales for the buyer. The buyer sometimes responds by cutting back on orders, which in turn forces the supplier to be even more conservative in raw material ordering and production. This could lead to a vicious cycle that ultimately benefits neither party. Table 1 summarizes the situation. Buyer firms in the leather shoe industry still prefer to source from high cost supplier firms located iri countries like Italy mainly because delivery times are very low. Quality is not a differentiating factor since buyers are more than satisfied with Indian exports. Thus, the low cost, high quality of Indian suppliers does not translate into large orders because of very long delivery lead times. Buyers obtain small quantities from Indian suppliers that they are confident will sell in advance, and wait until they have better information on demand before they place large orders on suppliers who have quick delivery times. This allows them to lower their costs a l ittle. In such a situation, small supplier firms, isolated from the consumer market, can only compete by meeting buyer needs better. This in turn can only be done by cutting costs and improving delivery times without sacrificing quality, and provides a foc us for the direction of 10 Vikalpa change. Cutting cost and lead times can be done by improving supply chain management as discussed later.
Framework for Analysis
It is possible to identify certain distinct stages in the development of clusters of small supplier firms with respect to supply chain coordination. In this framework, the perspective is that of the small, individual business unit which seeks to survive in a fiercely competitive environment. It is not necessary for such business units to pass through all these stages, and some unit might bypass one or more of them in its development over time. The key to competitive advantage is maintaining quality, keeping costs low, and providing quick response times. Inventory levels directly impact costs, and coordination between different links in the chain and effective production management affect delivery times and costs. Units use different strategies to manage inventories and the supply chain to provide quick response times, which can sometimes be used to enhance sales either by cutting costs or charging higher prices. Table 2 summarizes the different strategies used to manage the supply chain. The key assumptions underlying this framework are: obtained by the supplier firm is high.
• Delivery lead times are crucial for the buyer firms since they are in markets with fast changing consumer preferences.
• Price commanded by a supplier firm can be increased if delivery times can be improved, assuming quality standards are met consistently. In the first stage, supplier firms essentially act as jobbers, i.e., they produce against orders from buyer firms. The emphasis is on cost control, which in turn is focused on minimizing inventory, and there is little formal coordination between supplier firms and their suppliers, and manufacturing and operations are not seen as a potential weapon for competing. Keeping raw material and other inventories allows quick response times, but since input materials are a large proportion of the final cost, inventory costs go up. Due to uncertain demand, this could lead to piling up of unused stocks. Firms in the first stage do not hold stocks of expensive input items. The consequences of this are very large lead times since procurement of raw materials and components takes time, demand does not pick up, and there is very high uncertainty in order quantities and in delivery lead times. An order consists of several different products, which because of poor production systems, are produced in batches, and hence, one complete order often takes a long time to complete, typically a few weeks. Finished goods and work-in-process inventory stocks build up over this time period until the order is finally Vol. 24, No. 4, October -December 1999 11 • High demand uncertainty, in terms of total volume, or in terms of type of products.
• High working capital needs, i.e., the costs of raw materials as a proportion of the final price shipped out. Since manufacturing is not streamlined, work-in-process is high. This approach reduces costs of unsold stocks, and minimizes inventory holding costs (if implemented properly), but leads to long lead times, which does not really meet buyer needs. The major impact is in terms of sales growth and profits: buyers are unlikely to place large orders on stage 1 firms, and profits are uncertain since demand from buyer is uncertain. This occurs in spite of the supplier producing high quality, low cost products. In short, stage 1 firms are unable to grow because of a myopic focus on cutting costs of raw material inventories and unsold stocks. Several domestic firms acting as jobbers for overseas buyers in the garment and leather goods industries exhibit this type of behaviour. We call this the myopic stage.
In stage 2, a supplier firm might experiment with keeping inventories, especially if it is able to get slightly higher prices and buyers insist on faster deliveries. However, there is still little coordination with suppliers of raw materials and manufacturing systems have not been streamlined. This stage is similar to the first stage, except for one crucial difference. Delivery times are cut down because inventories are kept on hand to process orders immediately and raw material inventory holding costs are higher. As a consequence, uncertainty for the buyer regarding the final date of receipt also comes down to some extent. A unit operating with this policy will be viable either if order volumes pick up sufficie ntly to compensate for the increase in inventory costs or if they are able to command slightly higher prices. A variation of this strategy is a group of units keeping pooled inventories. If the coordination between units can be sustained, this policy will lead to lower inventory holding costs compared to inventories at individual units. In either case, the firm is said to be in the stage of defensive response where it seeks to meet customer requirements for quick deliveries without making major efforts to improve its operations. Stages 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 1 . However, a defensive response is likely to succeed only if it can offset higher inventory holding costs by obtaining higher volumes or higher price.
In stage 3, cooperation between raw material suppliers and the supplier firm is established. This enables supplier firms to get raw materials at short notice. This is an important strategic step in the evolution of the firm. For instance, leather tanneries in India take a few weeks to supply finished leather to supplier firms making shoes. On the other hand, Italian supplier firms are able to obtain finished leather in a few days. Coordination is achieved by long term Supplier gets larger volumes, better prices Buyer places larger, more predictable orders 'Defensive Response' Supplier relationships with raw material suppliers, sharing information on requirements over the entire season, sophisticated demand forecasting, and agreements not only on prices but also on terms of payment. Since suppliers do not have direct access to the finished products markets, they are in the dark about how to plan production. It is also well known that raw material suppliers face greater swings in demand as compared to supplier or buyer firms since uncertainty increases as we go upstream in the supply chain. Large product ranges and fluctuating and uncertain demand in turn leads to inventory shortages of certain components and raw materials, and unused stocks for other components and raw materials. Inventory costs are high and response to changing demand is slow. Information sharing between firms helps to resolve this critical problem. One of the major advantages of such coordination is that raw material suppliers in turn can respond quickly to the needs of business units because they have a clear picture of the demand from each supplier firm. Inventories will come down across the board for all units. In fact, this coordination cuts down the amount of raw material inventories in the supplier firm significantly since raw material delivery lead times come down. The main impact will be on costs, which will directly add to profitability. Lead times are also likely to go down as stockout of required raw materials for meeting orders from buyers will be eliminated. However, achieving this coordination requires a process of building trust and establishing long term relationships and is a difficult task. Such firms are in the stage of coordinated response.
Often, there is scope for an intermediary who stocks critical raw materials and quickly sends them to supplier firms at a small premium. Another option for larger supplier firms is to integrate backwards into raw materials especially if raw materials have other markets or customers to minimize risks. For instance, a shoe making unit could acquire a leather tannery since finished leather can also be sold in the market. Alternately, leather tanneries could forward integrate into shoe making. However, vertical integration has other risks and opportunities that need to be examined separately.
In stage 4, supplier units use manufacturing as a competitive weapon and streamline their production systems to handle product variety and fluctuating volumes, with a much lower production time. Since improving production requires changes in shop floor layouts, conversion of job shop like systems to flow shops organized by product lines, cutting changeover times, and better scheduling, it is often seen as a very difficult task or as something that does not justify the effort involved. This is why manufacturing improvements are often postponed to stage 4. However, if implemented properly, work-in-process and finished goods inventories will come down, and costs and delivery times can be further reduced. Such units are likely to increase sales volumes if quality, consistency, and reliability in delivery times can be maintained. These firms are said to be in the stage of full response, where inventory policies, coordination with raw material suppliers, and internal operations on the shop floor are all geared towards customer needs.
The combined effects of moving from stage 1 to stage 4 are significant for the supplier firm. Inventory costs come down and response times improve. In addition, working capital needs come down because of shorter lead times. Since supplier firms receive payment on receipt of goods, interest costs also come down if the entire lead time from raw material procurement to delivery is cut down. The major payoff, however, is more strategic since such firms can better meet buyer needs and hence gain in terms of larger orders or higher prices or both. Thus, for the typical small leather shoe exporter, who operates in stage 1, the implication is that keeping leather inventories (either alone or in a pool with other small firms), coordinating supplies from the tannery to cut the lead time for procurement, and streamlining manufacturing would move it to stage 4. This would enable it to cut lead times drastically, without adding too much to costs, and bargain with buyer firms to obtain higher prices in return for quick deliveries.
In stage 5, several supplier firms come together not only to collaborate on inventory management, but also on marketing and finance. Thus, there is a centralized set up or market making mechanism to obtain orders, allocate them to individual units, bargain for better prices, track information on costs of inputs, market trends, buyers requirements, and the nature of international competition. Financing for individual units could be provided at lower interest rates if working capital requirements are high. This collaboration can be extremely productive in the long run, as it leads to building up of marketing strengths and ability to develop or acquire brands. There are significant improvements possible even in operational terms. For instance, individual supplier firms could specialize by-product lines which would lead to more efficient production, lower costs and delivery lead times. The last column in Table 2 summarizes the benefits of such collaborations on a variety of output measures like inventory holding, lead times, production costs, impact on demand growth, and control over price commanded from buyer firms. Such collaborations have proved to be extremely useful in the case of the textile industry in Italy. Ciba India is playing the role of a market maker although it is not a cooperative of supplier firms. With its superior technology and financial muscle it can keep most of the profits to itself if it chooses to, rather than pass on benefits to supplier firms. The leather industry, on the other hand, has still a long way to go before it can become truly competitive.
The market maker could be a cooperative owned by supplier firms or an independent entity. However, it does more than what is conv entionally understood as the role of such intermediaries. It, of course, helps to obtain orders, bargains to obtain better prices, and helps allocate orders among supplier firms. However, it also sources critical raw materials quickly, and works closely with suppliers to improve their operations (as in the case of Ciba operations in India), and, if necessary, helps to ship goods out efficiently. Thus, its role goes beyond one of marketing and collective bargaining for higher prices, and includes building capabilities among supplier firms to meet customer Vol. 24, No. 4, October-December 1999 needs. In the examples discussed earlier, this means operating a supply chain that cuts down delivery times without increasing cost. Stage 5 firms are competitive and are shown in Figure 2 . There are examples of intermediate firms in India who obtain orders from buyer firms, and in turn place orders on supplier firms. This gives them a lot of flexibility since they have not invested in any production units, but have access to the output of a large number of small supplier firms. However, such an intermediate firm is unlikely to obtain the full benefits that are available when supplier firms and their raw material suppliers are well coordinated since its response to demand is limited by the capabilities of supplier firms. Ciba has overcome this problem by investing in developing the production capabilities of its supplier firms. However, most intermediate firms do not do this.
For a large supplier firm, a tempting option is to acquire an established brand by paying a buyer firm up front. Another option is to establish an independent brand name. However, there are some entry barriers. First, this is an expensive proposition.
Second, marketing and distributing products is very different from producing to order. Unless the supplier firm acquires marketing skills, it is unlikely to succeed. However, there have been instances of supplier firms moving into consumer markets, as in > the case of Arvind Mills which moved from denim export to marketing finished garments quite successfully. However, Arvind is a large firm and is an exception.
Policy and Other Interventions
Sustained success in business usually requires meeting customer needs consistently. It is clear that small firms exporting to markets with fast changing requirements are not equipped to deal with the situation. Policy interventions have, however, focused only on financial and economic measures like better credit and tax incentives, benefits for small business, or reservation of certain industries for the small scale sector. Although these measures might, be necessary in some cases, supplier firms will be unable to realize their full potential based only on policy interventions. Operational improvements, even if they are accepted as useful by policy makers, are usually left to market forces or to the business acumen of entrepreneurs. Industry or trade associations have usually not paid much attention to operational issues like effective supply chain management and quick delivery. Perhaps the reason lies in the fact that benefits gained from this are not well understood. However, if the process of small firm development is to be speeded up, attention to these issues is likely to help. Preliminary information from other countries like Brazil, Thailand, and Indonesia with successful supplier firms indicates that such operational improvements have taken place.
Conclusions
Large buyer firms with established brand names and access to lucrative markets are able to minimize the impact of demand uncertainty by outsourcing. However, supplier firms are far more vulnerable to uncertainties. They are not in a position to grow unless they successfully innovate and improve their operations in terms of managing inventories^ lead times, coordinating with key raw material suppliers, and improving shop floor practices. The key trade-off facing supplier firms is between lead time and cost, and unless they are able to command higher prices for shorter lead times, they are unlikely to grow in markets with highly uncertain demand. There is an evolution of small firms from the myopic cost minimization approach in stage 1, to a defensive response based on inventories in stage 2, a coordinated response based on closer ties with raw material suppliers in 
